

be no need for uniformity over wide areas of the world, or even, he suggested, for any conformity at all except on the basic rating structure. Each airline would have the much-needed flexibility to meet its markets with appropriate gradations of service, food, flight timing, leg space, entertainment and so on. "We could even teach them to play the piano for a price."

Specific controls, he recognised, would still be exercised by governments, and perhaps by Iata compliance. ("Like the poor, that will probably always be with us.") There were many other possible difficulties but also many answers. "The system can work if we want it to work."

In the discussion that followed Mr Dargan's paper there was a dissentient note from the president of El Al, Mordecai Ben-Ari, for whom the best solution would be no charters at all. Unless an answer was found to the charter problem within an institutional framework, he said, there would be no solution. "Scheduled services will never prosper so long as unregulated charters persist," he added; nor would they prosper without regulated prices. Mr Ben-Ari suggested that supplemental airlines should be integrated into the scheduled system, perhaps on a seasonal basis.

He agreed with Mr Dargan that closer attention should be paid to the cost of on-board service. Serious consideration should be given, he thought, to the complete abolition of cabin service.

Eric Sutherland of Thos. Cook & Son, representing UFTAA at the a.g.m., took issue with Mr Dargan; the scheduled airlines *could* beat the charterers by joining them, he said. The success of charters lay in their appeal to those with low purchasing power who were prepared to accept inflexible and rigid conditions in return for a low fare. How could the scheduled carriers attract such a customer? Only by offering the same services on the same conditions as did the legal charter operators.

The real problem, said Henry Marking, chairman of

BEA, was how to expand the market. There was no point in moving the same passengers at lower fares. "Mr Dargan seems to scorn the need to fill empty seats," he added. "We can fill those seats by catering for the cheap market. But we must not expand our capacity for that market, or we'll be back at square one. . . . We can't look to government regulation for charter protection; we must compete, and beat them at their own game."

Both Mr Marking and Philip Lawton, BEA board member, stressed that it was not feasible to meet charter competition through scheduled services. Such services were high-cost, said Mr Lawton, a point which Mr Dargan himself had made. The public wanted packaged holidays, and cheap travel was not an end in itself; new methods had therefore to be found of dealing with the competition.

BEA, said Mr Marking, was convinced that its approach—of developing its own charter services—was right, and was attracting traffic that would otherwise go to the charter airlines.

Frank Loy of Pan American said he could not see Mr Dargan's ideas on fares working out in practice, although he agreed that further study of the problems would be beneficial. General agreements on fares would not, he felt, be realistic; "filed tariffs are a commonsense tradition." That together with the effects of competition demanded the maintenance of enforcement; if there were no enforcement, there would be no need for any agreement, but if there were agreement, then it would be important to see that the agreement worked.

Mr Dargan's suggestion for further detailed study by Iata along the lines of his paper was accepted on the spot by the association's director-general, Knut Hummarskjöld. Reconciliation of the basic differences—El Al's implacable objections to charters, BEA's belief in them, Aer Lingus' healthy Atlantic load factors and Pan American's (and many other airlines') empty seats crying out to be filled—should provide some good talking points.

AIR TRANSPORT...

LIGHT COMMERCIAL & BUSINESS

Amending Part 91 The largest study to be undertaken in the 25-year history of the NBAA was the result of the Association's enquiries into the FAA proposal to place corporate aircraft operations under a new subpart D of FAR Part 91. The FAA proposal is the latest stage in the drafting of new safety legislation following the loss of a charter aircraft carrying a state football team in September 1970. The first Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was rejected by NBAA as being impracticable; it had required all operators of large or turbine-powered aircraft to operate to commercial air carrier standards.

The NBAA study has been directed at defining more clearly the nature of corporate aircraft operations, and in particular the relationship between time-sharing agreements and "hire and reward." FAA officials took part in the study and the resulting recommendations were due to be tabled at the end of November.

Propeller inspection Following an accident to a Beech 99A of Frontier Airlines near Cheyenne, Wyoming, involving the in-flight failure of a propeller blade, the



A third Twin Otter was delivered to Hamburg carrier General Air on November 28 and is seen here as it staged through Prestwick. It will be used for scheduled services and tourist flights in North Germany and Heligoland

NTSB has recommended the urgent inspection of that type of Hartzell propeller for the presence of cracks and tool marks. The Board says that it is aware of four previous instances of failure of this model of blade, although the present incident is the first time that failure has occurred in the air.

Skyvan stolen A Skyvan belonging to AiResearch Aviation was stolen from Seattle-Tacoma airport on November 15. The aircraft had been undergoing repairs in Canada and was being held in bond pending payment of customs duties.